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Abstract
The LHC is an opportunity to make a change. By thinking, and speaking
publicly, about fundamental concepts that underlie physical theory, the
physicist may both accrue public interest in his work and contribute to
the analysis of the foundations of modern physics.
We start by several remarks on the scientific and societal context of
today’s theoretical physics. Major classes of models for physics to be
explored at the LHC are then reviewed. This leads us to propose an
LHC timeline and a list of potential effects on theoretical physics and the
society.
We then explore three conceptual questions connected with the LHC
physics. These are placed in the context of debates both in high-energy
physics and in the philosophy of physics. Symmetry is the first issue: we
critically review the argument for its a priori and instrumental functions in
physical theory and study its connection with naturalness. If perceived as
a dynamical process in analogy with non-unitary measurement in quantum
mechanics, spontaneous symmetry breaking is found to emphasize the
role of randomness against physical law. Contrary to this cosmological
view, the strictly non-dynamical role of spontaneous symmetry breaking
within quantum field theory provides one of the strongest arguments in
favour of the instrumental approach to symmetry. Second, we study the
concept of effective field theory and its philosophical significance. Analogy
with S-matrix suggests that one should treat effective theory both as
a pragmatic and a provisional tool. Finally, we question the meaning
of fine tuning. Legitimate fine-tuning arguments are interpreted non-
ontologically. These are contrasted with unsound use of fine tuning, e.g.,
for comparing different models. Counterfactual reasoning referring to the
anthropic principle is shown to be problematic both conceptually and in
the light of quantum theory.
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1 What use for conceptual questions?
1.1 Look back and look forward
Several times in history new, unintuitive physics invalidated previously existing
commonplace views and revolutionized our understanding of the world. New
concepts appeared, which were consequently hailed as the centerpiece of a con-
ceptual foundation of physics. With regard to the launch in 2008 of the Large
Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN, few share the obstinate ambition to start a
similarly radical physical revolution. This event may however become the tip-
ping point of a new conceptual revolution. Indeed, models have been developed
in significant depth beyond the theories of the Standard Model (SM), but we
still miss a decisive input that would pick as correct one of the new ideas that
underlie these models. Which will be the one to triumph? This question leads
to two further questions about the future of theoretical physics: first, we stand
in the need of a forward-looking analysis of concepts which may soon make
their way to the center of the debate; second, the whole field may benefit from
a systematic study of argumentation methods that have been used to promote
theories beyond the Standard Model.
The LHC will probe the scale of symmetry breaking of the electroweak (EW)
interaction. As of today, this is the last element of the Standard Model left
without unambiguous support from experiment. We do not know whether the
Higgs mechanism will turn out to be what the Standard Model takes it to be:
a relatively unambitious but efficient way to remove the problem of Goldstone
bosons and to give a quantitatively sound account of the electroweak symmetry
breaking. It may be revealed that the SM Higgs mechanism is but a veil of
new physics (NP) beyond the Standard Model: either supersymmetry or extra
strong force or perhaps theories with extra dimensions.
Theorists have developed a great number of models. They were followed by
phenomenologists and experimentalists, who have thought about experimental
scenarios for corroborating these models in the signature content of the LHC
data. The job has taken at least 25 years of hard work of a big community;
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what has emerged at the end still sustains a lively discussion. On the eve of the
launch of the LHC, it is now time both for physicists and for the philosophers
of physics to look back at these 25 years, and to look forward at the future LHC
physics, wondering whether new models will put forward novel ideas capable of
entering the pantheon of fundamental physical knowledge.
1.2 Speak out but choose what you say
The launch of LHC will be an immediate scoop covered by mass media. However,
it may or may not have a long-term, lasting effect on physics and on society.
Whether it will have an effect on physics will depend on physical discoveries
that remain to be made and on the existing landscape of competing models,
to be discussed below. Whether it will have an effect on society, aside from
purely scientific causes, will be influenced by the behaviour of all interested
parties, foremostly communicating scientists and educators. Being the first
major accelerator built for fundamental physics since 1980s, the LHC provides
a unique opportunity for raising public awareness of the set of concepts and
ideas which underlie the scientific worldview. Above all, in societal terms, LHC
is an opportunity to renew the enthusiasm for understanding the world, after
decades of its gradual fading and of growing fatigue for all things complex, like
science or mathematics.
The LHC is an opportunity to make a change. Whether such a change will
occur in the public attitude toward physics depends on how physicists will speak
about the LHC and what they will say. The best way to oppose the decline of
public interest for high energy physics is to think critically about our current
choice of both rhetoric and content in outreach activities. A new, different choice
could boost a move from communication focused on the mathematical content or
projected results of advanced physical theories, to the language and rhetoric that
would emphasize the key conceptual ideas and fundamental principles which are
at stake. When a physicist tells the public a popular story about one or another
mathematical model, or about concerns of a closed community whose interests
are not shared by the larger group, the public is no less estranged that when it
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hears an oracle in a temple. The physicist casually tends to adopt the attitude
of lecturing: “You don’t understand this, I’ll explain you that...” What follows
is an attempt to give a glimpse of the theory that has a complex mathematical
formulation, and one often hears phrases like “This is not really true, but for now
I’ll take it to be so-and-so, because I can’t explain without the full mathematics
what is really going on.” There is nothing bad in lecturing on subjects such as
advanced physical theories. Popularization of science is a fascinating occupation.
The problem lies elsewhere: the physicist typically believes that a lecture will
suffice to illuminate and calm the audience and create a feeling of awe for his
work. He all too often ignores that it can also create estrangement, alienation,
and a feeling of futility.
The path to regained interest of the public lies through the creation of a
sense of inclusion and familiarity, so that the public could identify themselves
with the physics community and sympathize with it in its concerns. Popular
science is not enough a tool to achieve this. An alternative way of telling the
story is now pressing: instead of alienating the public with words which it does
not understand, start with a comprehensible notion like symmetry or chance,
and then lead the public gradually to the deeper analysis of the role and meaning
of this notion in science. One can only be successful in telling this story if one
has first thought deeply himself about the conceptual questions in physics and
has sorted out and structured his knowledge accordingly.
Most physicists are unready to venture into what they commonly call ‘phi-
losophy’: not the familiar solid ground of mainstream research, where a scien-
tifically valid ‘yes’ or ‘no’ can always be given, but a shaky and risky field of
not-just-science, i.e., of thinking about science. The working physicist rarely
makes an effort to comprehend and convey deep conceptual issues that come
before any mathematical development in the theory he’s working on. Members
of the theoretical physics community, including some of the most lucid, some-
times claim that they all work like one person, in unison, and there can be no
disagreement between them about well-known physics. This is true, or almost,
as far as the mathematical content of physical theory is concerned. It is not
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true with respect to the meaning of mathematical models or the significance of
the underlying concepts. That the claim about thinking in unison is made so
often indicates that the theoretical physics community does not fully appreci-
ate the importance and the role of what is dubbed ‘philosophy’ — of asking
questions about meaning. Such questions were outmoded at the time when
theoretical physics became a technology-oriented endeavour in close connection
with nuclear engineering. This is true no more; the time has changed. The LHC
physics is not technoscience developed for industrial application or competitive
economic benefit; rather it is an issue of fundamental curiosity. Hence it is no
more possible to wave the questions of meaning aside as non-practical. They
belong inherently with the curiosity that keeps the LHC physics going.
For example, let the physicist ask what it means to take symmetry for a
fundamental building block of our understanding of the world. How does renor-
malization group change our view of scales, of reality, and of how we theorize?
What new understanding of mathematical entities such as the infinity or the
perturbation series does it bring along? Ask these questions before students
and welcome controversy and absence, better impossibility, of the right answer.
Explain that taking sides with respect to such questions is not a cheap business
or pure rhetoric: one has to master a great deal of scientific theory before his
argument becomes sound and defendable in view of its harsh critique by op-
ponents. Show the path leading from a simple “I think” or “I believe” to the
complex physical knowledge that one must possess, and the full set of choices
to which this particular belief commits.
Do not say that physics has been separated from philosophy. The latter has
evolved with the former. Every particular field of knowledge, and physics is
no exception, presupposes the most general principles without which it would
not be knowledge. The philosophy of physics is a study of this foundational
and systematic core: fundamental notions formulated in a non-technical way
still underlie any development in physical theory. For Schlick [89] as well as
for Friedman [38], “all great scientists think every problem with which they are
concerned up to the end, and the end of every problem lies in philosophy.”
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Explain to the student that it is not possible nowadays to play with words
as if there were no price to pay for this game, in terms of consistency of what
is being said. Tell him that science underwrites much of what is sound in
philosophy. Start your first lecture with the words of ordinary language, like
symmetry or probability, and continue all the way down to the last lecture,
where complex mathematics, which is necessary to distinguish a serious theory
using these ordinary terms from a language game, will become familiar.
The job of theoretical physicist is not to write equations. It belongs with
reaching to the essence of things, as quantum gravity pioneer Matvei Bronstein
said at the beginning of 1930s. Theoretical physicist receives training in under-
standing what is essential, and so formulated, this training is highly attractive
for the young. Later in his career, theoretical physicist may change jobs and
become, for instance, a biologist or a financier. Nonetheless, he will be uniquely
qualified for this new life because he will have learned to seek the deepest level
of meaning of all things.
The LHC is an opportunity to explain to the society and to young students
what it is to be a particle physicist. Teach students about concepts and ideas
first; learning complex mathematics will follow. Speak to them not in the in-
comprehensible technical language, but make sure they will learn a method and
a way of thinking. To keep them interested, tell them a story about symmetry,
or the vacuum, or the infinity, or the role of the observer, or the meaning of
probabilistic reasoning.
1.3 Structure of this article
In Section 2 we describe the SM Higgs mechanism and its problems. Alternative
models beyond the SM are presented in Section 3. A timeline for their searches
at the LHC is proposed in Section 4 along with a hypothetical timeline for
impacts of these searches on the physics community.
Three conceptual problems, among others, will be influenced by the LHC
results: the role of symmetry (Section 5), the use of effective theories (Section 6),
and the value of probabilistic reasoning (Section 7). Symmetry is both an apriori
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justification of physical theories and a tool for their construction. It is the
cornerstone of a worldview dating back from the early 1920s, which has proved
very successful for the 20th-century physics. In 1970s the fundamental notion
of symmetry was complemented by another key concept, the effective theory
approach. Both of these may have attained their limit. Physics of the 21st
century may be driven by new ideas like, for instance, duality relations or the
holographic principle. Perturbation theory used for building our current models
may cease to play the central role. A radically minded observer would claim that
we may witness an overwhelming victory of models with strong forces, where
perturbative methods are inapplicable. Be it true or not, even a conservative
ought to acknowledge that the long-serving physics toolkit was extended to
include new instruments.
The third conceptual question concerns probabilistic reasoning. It stems
from a sheer observation that doing cutting-edge physics is a difficult task and it
often remains beyond the reach of experimental verification. From the problems
of the Standard Model we know that we shall eventually find new physics. It
is also clear that in order to correspond to the available experimental data,
simple proposals for this new physics, not overladen with extra structure, must
be fine-tuned. Models that may be tuned not as highly are complicated and less
beautiful. In the absence of conclusive experimental data, some are tempted
to use reasoning based on the degree of fine tuning as argument pro or contra
particular theories. This surprising inference, as well as the reference to the
anthropic principle, raises the question of value and meaning of probabilistic
reasoning in theoretical physics.
Further conceptual questions could be asked, i.e., about the meaning and
the role of anomalies or concerning the fine distinction between the concept of
theory and that of model. These are left beyond the scope of present work.
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2 Meaning of the Higgs mechanism
The observed weak interaction is not locally gauge invariant. Its unification with
electromagnetic interaction must take this fact into account. This is achieved by
proposing a mechanism within the unification model, which puts the two interac-
tions back on unequal grounds. By offering one such mechanism the Standard
Model describes the electroweak symmetry breaking quantitatively, but does
not explain it [83, p. 8]. This mechanism, theorized in 1964 independently by
several different groups and named after Peter Higgs, can be summarized as
follows: a massless spin-one particle has two polarization states; a massive one
has three. The physical degree of freedom of the would-be Goldstone boson
from EW symmetry breaking is absorbed by the massless gauge boson in order
to allow it to increase the number of its polarization states from two to three
and to become massive. Massive gauge bosons will then account for the absence
of gauge symmetry in the observed weak interaction.∗
This description was quickly recognized to be not very compelling [45, p. 12],
precisely due to its lack of explanatory power. Many physicists did not find
important the conceptual problems of the Higgs mechanism simply because
they took it for no more than a convenient, but temporary, solution of the
problem of electroweak symmetry breaking. For example, Jean Iliopoulos said
at the 1979 Einstein Symposium: “Several people believe, and I share this
view, that the Higgs scheme is a convenient parametrization of our ignorance
concerning the dynamics of spontaneous symmetry breaking, and elementary
scalar particles do not exist” [59]. On a similar note, in an article written at the
end of 1970, Wilson had clearly stated his doubt: “It is interesting to note that
there are no weakly coupled scalar particles in nature; scalar particles are the
only kind of free particles whose mass term does not break either an internal or a
gauge symmetry. . . .Mass or symmetry-breaking terms must be ‘protected’ from
∗Ten years after the original proposal, the Higgs mechanism was interpreted as a solution
to the problem of maintaining unitarity of the weak interaction at high energies [69, 68]. This
view originated in the S-matrix approach, where unitarity is a condition imposed on S matrix
(see Section 6.3). Thirty years later the same line of thought produced higgsless models of
electroweak interactions which restore unitarity through extra dimensions [27].
9
large corrections at large momenta due to various interactions (electromagnetic,
weak, or strong). . . . This requirement means that weak interactions cannot be
mediated by scalar particles” [108].
Things have seemingly changed since. The discovery ofW and Z bosons and
further experiments providing EW data have confirmed the Standard Model
with a very good precision, including quantum corrections. The result was
a change in the majority of physicists’ view on the scalar Higgs boson. By
2004, for example, Wilson has been completely assured: “A claim that scalar
elementary particles were unlikely to occur in elementary particle physics at
currently measurable energies . . .makes no sense” [109]. We have today more
confidence in the Standard Model; and we have learned that changing it could
only come with a great cost in adjusting the theory’s parameters, thanks to the
exceedingly large number of experimental tests with which they have to conform.
Still, two paths remain open for that who wishes to express uneasiness about
the SM Higgs mechanism.
The first path has to do with the lack of comprehension of the spontaneous
symmetry breaking (SSB). As Morrison notes [74], the Standard Model rests on
crucial assumptions about the nature of the vacuum, and yet these assumptions
are, in a very significant sense, not subject to direct empirical confirmation. For
Morrison, application of the SSB mechanism in the SM is a question about the
reality status of the SU(2)L×U(1)Y symmetry, i.e., an issue of physical ontology.
For Healey [55], it is an issue of providing a sound mathematical foundation of
the SSB mechanism, which would resolve the problem of comprehending SSB
in a rigorous language. Discovery of the Higgs boson would allegedly provide
more assurance that these two challenges could be met.
The second path is due to a problem of different nature with the SM Higgs
mechanism: experimental rather than methodological. Certainly the Higgs
mechanism is the most economical solution for breaking the electroweak sym-
metry. Moreover, the global fit of the electroweak precision data is consistent
with the Standard Model, giving some indications for the presence of a light
Higgs. These indications, however, are troublesome in the details: different
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ways of calculating the Higgs mass mH , based on different confirmed experi-
mental data, lead to incompatible predictions. The fit of the observables most
sensitive tomH has a probability of less than 2%. Giudice provides a compelling
demonstration of the arising tension [46]:
The preferred value of the Higgs mass is mH = 76+33−24 GeV, with
a 95% CL upper limit mH < 144 GeV, raised to mH < 182 GeV
once the direct lower limit mH > 114 GeV is included [51]. There
are however some reasons of concern for the SM picture with a light
Higgs.
First of all, the decrease in the value of the top-quark mass measured
at the Tevatron has worsened the SM fit. In particular, the value of
the top mass extracted from EW data (excluding the direct Tevatron
measurements) is mt = 178.9+11.7−8.6 GeV, while the latest CDF/D0
result is mt = 170.9± 1.8 GeV [24]∗.
Of more direct impact on the light Higgs hypothesis is the ob-
servation that the two most precise measurements of sin2 θW do
not agree very well, differing by more than 3σ. The bb¯ forward-
backward asymmetry A0,lfb measured at LEP gives a large value of
sin2 θW , which leads to the prediction of a relatively heavy Higgs
with mH = 420+420−190 GeV. On the other hand, the lepton left-right
asymmetry Al measured at SLD (in agreement with the leptonic
asymmetries measured at LEP) gives a low value of sin2 θW , cor-
responding to mH = 31+33−19 GeV, in conflict with the lower limit
mH > 114 GeV from direct LEP searches [9]. Moreover, the world
average of the W mass, mW = 80.392 ± 0.029 GeV, is larger than
the value extracted from a SM fit, again requiring mH to be smaller
than what is allowed by the LEP Higgs searches.
The situation is summarized on Figure 1, where the predicted values of
physical Higgs mass from different observables are shown. While A0,lfb prefers a
∗This is the 2007 result. The 2008 one is mt = 172.6± 0.8(stat)± 1.1(syst) GeV [37].
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Figure 1: Values of the Higgs mass extracted from different EW observables.
The vertical line is the direct LEP lower limit of 114 GeV. The average is shown
as a green band [51].
relatively heavy Higgs, Al andmW require a very light Higgs already excluded by
LEP. Only when we average over all (partially inconsistent!) data, as Giudice
emphasizes, do we obtain the prediction for a relatively light Higgs and the
usual upper bound mH < 182 GeV. He then continues, “Although there is
little doubt that the SM gives a satisfactory description of the EW data, this
inconsistency of predictions makes the argument in favor of SM with a light
Higgs less compelling.” What is the meaning of the probabilistic argument
based on a 2% fit? In what sense exactly does it make the SM Higgs less
compelling?
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3 Some theories beyond the Standard Model
3.1 Big and little hierarchy problems
This section is adapted from Rattazzi’s account of what he calls the ‘LEP para-
dox’ [83]. We deliberately quote it at length, with only one modification: Rat-
tazzi’s discussion of fine tuning, scattered in the original all over the text, is
brought together in one final paragraph.
The Standard Model suffers from the ‘big’ hierarchy problem: in the La-
grangian, the Higgs mass parameter m2H , which is related to the physical mass
by m2h = −2m2H , is affected by incalculable cut-off dependent quantum correc-
tions. Whichever new theory replaces the Standard Model above some scale
ΛNP, it is reasonable to expect, barring unwarranted cancelations, the Higgs
mass parameter to be at least of the same size as (or bigger than) the SM con-
tribution computed with a cut-off scale ΛNP. This way of estimating the size
of the Higgs mass is made reasonable by many explicit examples that solve the
hierarchy problem, and also by the analogy with the electromagnetic contribu-
tion to m2pi+ −m2pi0 . The leading quantum correction is then expected to come
from the top sector and is estimated to be
δm2H ∼ −
3λ2t
8pi2
Λ2NP . (1)
This contribution is compatible with the allowed range of m2h only if the
cut-off is rather low
ΛNP < 600× ( mh200GeV)GeV . (2)
Now, if the energy range of the SM validity is as low as 500 GeV – 1 TeV, why
did previous experiments not detect any deviation from the SM predictions?
Even though the center of mass energy of these experiments was significantly
lower than 1 TeV, still their precision was high enough to make them sensitive
to virtual effects associated with a much higher scale.
Effects from new physics at a scale ΛNP can in general be parametrized by
adding to the SM renormalizable Lagrangian the whole tower of higher dimen-
sional local operators, with coefficients suppressed by the suitable powers of
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ΛNP:
LNPeff =
1
Λ2NP
{
c1(e¯γµe)2 + c2W IµνB
µνH†τIH + . . .
}
. (3)
At leading order it is also sufficient to consider only the operators of lowest
dimension, d = 6. The lower bound on ΛNP for each individual operator Oi,
neglecting the effects of all the others and normalizing |ci| = 1, ranges between
2 and 10 TeV. Turning several coefficients on at the same time does not qual-
itatively change the result, unless parameters are tuned. The interpretation of
these results is that if New Physics affects electroweak observables at tree level,
for which case ci ∼ O(1), the generic lower bound on the new threshold is a few
TeV. The tension between this lower bound and eq. (2) defines what is known
as the little hierarchy problem.
The little hierarchy problem is apparently mild. But its behaviour with
respect to fine tuning is problematic. If we allow fine tuning of order ² then
the bound in eq. (2) is relaxed by a factor 1/
√
². The needed value of ² grows
quadratically with ΛNP, so that for ΛNP = 6 TeV we need to tune to 1 part in
a hundred in order to have mH = 200 GeV.
3.2 Supersymmetry
Among known solutions to the big hierarchy problem supersymmetry at first
appears to be the most satisfactory. This is mainly because it also leads to
the unification of coupling constants and provides dark matter candidates. The
main problem of supersymmetry is that neither the Higgs nor any supersym-
metric particles have been observed at LEP, while the most studied realization
of supersymmetry, MSSM, having a minimal field content, predicts the mass of
the lightest CP-even Higgs particle below 140 GeV [52, p. 55]. Comparing with
the LEP lower bound of 114 GeV, an official report concludes that MSSM has
the “‘fine tuning’ and ‘little hierarchy’ problems” [52, p. 57].
How much of a problem is the fine tuning will be discussed below. There are
different ways of quantifying its degree in MSSM. One way is to do a standard
calculation which leads to the result that MSSM is fine tuned at 1 to 5% [83,
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of a minimal supersymmetric model with universal
scalar mass m, unified gaugino mass M and Higgsino mass µ at the GUT
scale [47].
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p. 4]. Another way is illustrated in Figure 2. It shows the phase diagram of
a typical supersymmetric model. In a large fraction of parameter space (the
yellow area) we find a phase with symmetry breaking SU2 × U1 → U1 , show-
ing that the radiative EW symmetry breaking phenomenon is a rather typical
feature of low-energy supersymmetry. However, in most of this region, the su-
persymmetric particles have masses not far from MZ ; they have been excluded
by experimental searches. Only a thin sliver of parameter space survives (the
purple area), a measure of the amount of tuning that supersymmetric theories
must have in order to pass the experimental tests. The surviving region has the
characteristic of lying very close to the critical line that separates the phases
with broken and unbroken EW symmetry. Either minimal supersymmetry is
not the right solution or, if and when it is eventually discovered at the LHC,
we will have to understand why it lies in a ‘near-critical’ condition with respect
to EW symmetry breaking. And this discovery, if minimal supersymmetry is
correct, cannot be missed: we now have a no-lose theorem for the MSSM, which
stipulates that the MSSM lightest Higgs boson cannot be present in nature and
yet beyond the observational capacity of the LHC [53].
Another family of supersymmetric models, NMSSM, has lately become pop-
ular due to the expectations that MSSM may fail experimentally. The simplest
member of the NMSSM family (further called, as the whole family, NMSSM) is
a model which differs from MSSM by the introduction of just one neutral singlet
superfield. For NMSSM, there is only a partial no-lose theorem [35]. Indeed,
by its very design NMSSM is constructed so as to avoid the MSSM limitations
on the Higgs particle, and it is therefore natural to expect that the NMSSM
Higgs may escape observation at the LHC. At the tree level the NMSSM Higgs
sector has seven parameters, while the one of MSSM has four. Thus, NMSSM
has more freedom for fitting its parameters to the EW precision data: it is fine
tuned at about 10%, one order of magnitude above the MSSM [83, p. 4].
If supersymmetry is discovered, a difficult task for the experiments will be
to disentangle the various supersymmetric models and identify the pattern of
soft terms [46]. Not only can this problem be experimentally challenging [52,
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Section 3.3], but it can also be theoretically intricate due to the possible involve-
ment of a hidden sector in the running of TeV-scale SUSY terms to the Planck
scale. Identification of soft terms contributes to answering a more general ques-
tion of how supersymmetry is broken. Candidate SUSY breaking mechanisms
abound, covering a large spectrum of models from metastable vacua and the in-
volvement of gravity to several kinds of dynamical symmetry breaking [60], and
their phenomenology remains to be explored and confronted with experiment.
3.3 Little Higgs models
There exist various interesting models beyond the SM in which the Higgs is a
composite particle. In the last ten years appeared a new class of such models
called Little Higgs (LH) models. The idea is to overcome the little hierarchy
problem and make mH much smaller with respect to ΛNP than suggested in
eq. (1) by turning the Higgs into a pseudo-Goldstone boson. Consequently,
treating the Higgs as a pseudo-Golstone boson is prototypical of this class. The
Higgs mass is here protected by multiple approximate symmetries and it can be
generated only after collective symmetry breaking at two or more loops. The
distinctive feature at the LHC will be the production of new states of the W ,
Z, t.
Inspiration for the pseudo-Goldstone idea comes from low energy hadron
physics, where pions represent the Goldstone bosons associated with the sponta-
neous breakdown of chiral symmetry group SU(2)L×SU(2)R down to diagonal
isospin group SU(2)I . Quark masses mq and the electromagnetic interaction
αEM explicitly break chiral symmetry by a small amount, giving rise to small
pion masses. In particular, m2pi+ receives an electromagnetic correction of order
m2pi+ ∼
αEM
4pi
Λ2QCD ¿ Λ2QCD. (4)
In analogy with this process, we could think of an extension of the Standard
Model where the Higgs particle is a composite Goldstone boson associated to
some new strong dynamics at a scale ΛStrong.
General scheme of symmetry breaking in the Little Higgs models is given on
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Figure 3. Its concrete realizations depend on whether G and F are chosen to
be a simple or a product group. For a product group, a typical representative
is the Littlest Higgs model [6], where G/H = SU(5)/SO(5) and F = [SU(2)×
U(1)]2. Example of a simple group little Higgs is G/H = [SU(3)/SU(2)]2,
F = SU(3)[×U(1)] [63].
Figure 3: A global symmetry group of the Little Higgs models G is sponta-
neously broken down to a subgroup H by the Goldstone mechanism. Only a
subgroup F of G is gauged, and therefore the SM electroweak gauge symmetry
is identified with I = F ∩H [25].
By replacing αEM → αt and ΛQCD → ΛStrong in eq. (4), we generically
expect, in analogy with QCD, m2H ∼ αt4piΛ2Strong. Since in this case ΛNP ∼
ΛStrong, this is the same order as the very big leading quantum correction to
mH . Therefore, the Little Higgs construction must avoid the appearance of the
lowest order contribution to m2H .
Consider indeed the expression for the mass of a Higgs pseudo-Goldstone
boson, to all orders in the coupling constants
m2H =
(
ci
αi
4pi
+ cij
αiαj
(4pi)2
+ . . .
)
Λ2Strong .
We can think of couplings αi as external sources that transform non-trivially
under the Goldstone symmetry, thus breaking it, very much like an external
electric field breaks the rotational invariance of atomic levels. As in atomic
physics, the coefficients ci, cij , . . . are controlled by the symmetry selection
rules. We can then in principle think of a clever choice of symmetry group
and couplings such that the Goldstone symmetry is partially restored when any
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single coupling αi vanishes. In that situation only the combined effect of at
least two distinct couplings αi and αj can destroy the Goldstone nature of the
Higgs thus contributing a mass to it. The symmetry is said to be collectively
broken, ci = 0 and
m2H ∼ (
α
4pi
)2Λ2Strong . (5)
From this equation we then expect ΛStrong ∼ 10TeV, which seems to be what
is needed to avoid the little hierarchy problem.
In the Little Higgs models there are two sources of operator contributions
to the Lagrangian of effective theory. The first source is associated to the yet
unknown physics at the cut-off ΛStrong, at which the Higgs is composite. It
necessarily gives rise to operators involving just the Higgs boson, where vector
bosons appear only through covariant derivatives. For ΛStrong ∼ 10TeV, these
effects are not in contradiction with the data. The situation would however be
bad if light fermions too were composite at ΛStrong, but, fortunately, fermion
compositeness is not a necessary ingredient of LH models. The second source
of effects is mainly associated with the intermediate vector bosons W±H , Z
H , . . .
with mass ∼ 1TeV. It leads to fine tuning LH models, and the calculated
amount of fine tuning for normally weak gauge couplings — below 10% — is
comparable with the amount of fine tuning in supersymmetry.
3.4 Models with extra dimensions
Until recently, Newtonian gravity has been tested only down to distances of the
order of centimeter. This left open the possibility that its behaviour could be
different below 1 mm. New experiments have put more severe constraints on a
possible departure from Newtonian gravity, but due to an enormous difficulty to
measure the gravitational force at short distances, these constraints are currently
too mild to be conclusive (Figure 4).
Thus, extra spatial dimensions could accommodate gravitational interac-
tions beyond reach of currently available data. Moreover, this could be done in
such a way that that the resulting picture contribute to the solution of the big
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various theoretical predictions that would modify Newtonian gravity [42].
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hierarchy problem. No new fundamental scale of 1019 GeV would be needed,
and the hierarchy between electroweak and Planck scales would be explained
away thanks to effects of gravity in extra dimensions. Two principal scenarios
realizing this idea are the ADD model with large extra dimensions [5] and the
class of Randall-Sundrum models with warped extra dimensions [82]. A third
class of models includes so called TeV−1 and universal extra dimensions, which
avoid addressing the big hierarchy problem.
The idea to relate physics of extra dimensions with observable phenomena
has first appeared in the context of string theory. Later on, it was realized
that stringy braneworld scenarios could be brought to the TeV scale without
the use of strings and developed into full-fledged models independently of one’s
preferred theory of quantum gravity.
Because extra spatial dimensions do not lead to modifications of gravity at
observable scales, they must be compactified. Upon compactification, the full
gauge group Gextra breaks down to Gweak, and the remaining extra dimensional
polarizations (if any) Aα5 , A
α
6 , . . . are massless at tree level. Like in the Little
Higgs models, one can imagine that Gextra/Gweak contains a Higgs doublet at
EW scale. The extra dimensional symmetry then forbids large local contribu-
tions to the Higgs mass, implying that all remaining contributions to m2H must
be associated to non-local, hence finite, quantum corrections [46].
In the large extra dimensions model, the SM fields (except for singlets like
right-handed neutrinos) are confined to the 3-dimensional brane while gravity
propagates in all 3 + n spatial dimensions. The n extra dimensions are com-
pactified, and, depending on n = 2 . . . 7, their characteristic radius may vary
from 1 mm to 10−15 m, hence the name ‘large’. In fact, ‘largeness’ is not ex-
plained and is a mere artifact necessary for removing the hierarchy problem.
The Planck-weak hierarchy is replaced by a new hierarchy problem, whereby
the gap between the scales of gravity and electroweak forces, though now much
smaller, still needs explication.
In this model, gravity is strong at the TeV scale and produces a continuous
tower of Kaluza-Klein states. Its signatures in collider experiments include di-
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rect graviton production and virtual graviton exchange in scattering processes.
LEP and Tevatron data together with constraints from cosmology have suc-
ceeded in excluding the case n = 2 as a solution to the hierarchy problem [67, 12].
However other options in the ADD construction remain open.
The TeV−1 extra dimensions model lowers the GUT scale by changing the
running of the coupling constants. Gauge bosons are in the bulk, and gravity is
not at all a part of this picture. Current limits set the lower limit of 6 TeV−1
on the characteristic radius of extra dimensions. The KK tower of the model
contains equally distanced excitations, which resembles the phenomenology of
yet another model called universal extra dimensions. In the latter, branes are
not present at all and all SM field propagate in the bulk.
Figure 5: Summary of experimental and theoretical constraints on the Randall-
Sundrum model for the case where the Standard Model fields are constrained
to the TeV-brane. Sensitivity of the Tevatron and of the LHC to graviton res-
onances in the Drell-Yan channel is represented respectively by the blue curve
and red dashed and solid lines, corresponding to 10 and 100 fb−1 of the LHC in-
tegrated luminosity. Thus, the full parameter space can be completely explored
at the LHC, which will either discover or exclude the simple RS model [56, 28].
Arguably most daring and conceptually innovating idea of extra dimensions
is based on the AdS/CFT correspondence [70]. It is a manifestation of the
fundamental concept of holography, born within string theory and imported in
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model building and phenomenology. Holography suggests that there exists a
deep relation between 5-d and 4-d theories. As in quantum mechanics, where
particles and waves are two different aspects of the same physical reality, con-
cepts of spatial dimension and force may turn out to be nothing more than dual
descriptions of the same phenomenon. In the Randall–Sundrum (RS) model [82],
interval y = [0, Rc] in the fifth dimension is warped by the metric
ds2 = e−2kydxµdxµ + dy2. (6)
Geometrically, this is a slice of anti-de-Sitter space AdS5 with two branes (called
the TeV and the Planck branes) sitting at the boundaries of the slice, each of
which has the Minkowski metric. The picture of a TeV brane and a Planck
brane separated along the fifth coordinate can be replaced by the usual 4-d
renormalization group flow between infrared (TeV) and ultraviolet (Planck)
scales. In this sense, there is also a correspondence between position in the fifth
dimension and energy, which is typical of a gravitational field.
Length k−1 in eq. (6) characterizes the distance beyond which curvature
effects are important. Warp factor e−2ky describes therefore the red shift in the
energy of any process taking place at y relative to the same process taking place
at y = 0. As Rattazzi notes, this is conceptually analogous to the relative red
shift of light emitted in a given atomic transition by atoms sitting at different
heights in the gravitational field of the Earth [83]. However, unlike on Earth, in
the RS metric the curvature of space-time is large; the red shift is then huge and
can explain the big hierarchy problem between electroweak and Planck scales.
The peculiarity of the ADD and RS models is that phenomenological pre-
dictions at the TeV scale are combined with a solution of the big hierarchy
problem. In this sense both can be considered serious competitors of super-
symmetry. In the RS case, extra dimensions are small and can be stabilized
at kRc ' 11 − 12 [56]. Still, as in supersymmetry, the estimate of the amount
of fine tuning for the simple RS model due to electroweak constraints is at the
level of 10%, which is analogous to LH models [26]. The collider signature and
the allowed parameter space of the simple RS model (Figure 5) are such that
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the LHC will either confirm or completely exclude it. However, extensions of
the RS model, with fermions allowed to reside in the bulk, are more complex,
less fine tuned, and not so easily detectable experimentally.
4 The LHC physical and societal timeline
The main advantage of the LHC is that its event rate will be much higher than
at previous accelerators thanks to the center-of-mass energy of 14 TeV. In many
important channels, numbers of events produced per year will be 3 to 4 orders
of magnitude larger than at the Tevatron. However, it would be precocious to
claim that “the LHC will immediately enter new territory as it turns on” or that
“major discoveries could very well follow during the first year of operation” [44].
Historical precedents are ambivalent and suggest a more moderate rhetoric: if
the discovery ofW and Z bosons followed in the first month of collider operation,
ten years later it took the Tevatron much longer to start exploring truly new
territory [43].
The main problem of the LHC is that although signal rates will be larger
than at the Tevatron, in many cases signal-to-background ratios are expected
to be worse. For example, at 14 TeV the cross-section for background hadron
jets in searches of the Higgs boson at 150 GeV is five orders of magnitude larger
than the signal cross-section. Thus, the enormous QCD background completely
overwhelms the signal. To be able to detect the light Higgs on such a back-
ground, one has to spend considerable time on mastering the structure of the
background; and then to look for significantly less probable Higgs decay chan-
nels than the dominant mode of hadron jet production H → bb¯. The leading
detectable mode is a rare decay of the Higgs into a photon pair H → γγ [52,
p. 87]. Presence of the dominant decay into hadron jets may however suppress
the branching ratio of the photon mode by a factor of the order of 10 to several
hundred, depending on the coupling of the Higgs boson to new particles. It
is sometimes stated that this “raises serious questions as to the capability of
the LHC to discover the light Higgs boson” [52, p. 91]. To summarize, both the
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overly optimistic and the overly pessimistic exaggerations of the Higgs detection
will probably prove not to be true. It is clear that a gradual increase in lumi-
nosity and more statistics will be necessary before the LHC can start reaching
definitive conclusions.
Correct identification of the underlying new physics will not be easy too.
A percent level accuracy appears to be mandatory in order to have a suitable
sensitivity to discriminate between different models [52, p. 61]. For example,
universal extra dimensions, where all SM fields are in the bulk, can be mistaken
for the production of supersymmetric states [52, p. 63]. Similarly, distinguishing
between different Little Higgs models may require many years of data collection
at the LHC.
Slowness may become the keyword, and not necessarily an unwelcome one. If
the discoveries don’t pop up quickly, a meticulous, slow analysis of the collected
data will have more credibility than the promises of “the most glorious and
fruitful” epoch in the history of CERN [44].
Because of the little hierarchy problem, one expects that if there is SUSY at
the TeV scale, then masses of squarks and gluinos should not exceed 3 TeV. The
LHC may quickly discover SUSY at 1 TeV thanks to spectacular signatures of
the decays of sparticles in the form of missing energy due to undetectable LSPs.
However, it will take up to 8 to 10 years and a big increase in luminosity to
say if there is SUSY at 3 TeV. During all these years, while SUSY will not be
exactly falsified, the possible negative results will be dealt with by changing the
parameters of the theory, as it happened in the past with LEP2 searches. At
the same time, the failure to discover TeV-scale SUSY during the first year of
the LHC may result, sociologically, in a growing dissatisfaction of the physics
community with the idea of low-energy SUSY. We hypothesize that if by the end
of 2010 no Higgs particle below 140 GeV is found and no evidence for TeV-scale
SUSY is produced, the sociological effect may be such that new concepts, like
extra dimensions, will become the main focal point of the physics community.
Already today solutions of the hierarchy problem alternative to SUSY have
shown a clear gain in popularity [18, p. 6]. It may happen so that, without
25
waiting for the full test of SUSY up to 3 TeV, theoretical physics will become
more interested in the notions of duality and the holographic principle and will
terminate its 30-year-long romance with supersymmetry. The latter will only
survive at high energies as a necessary ingredient of string theory. But in two
or three years its low-energy version as well as the general fascination with
supersymmetry may be both gone.
We adopt here with additions and modifications a timeline for the LHC
operation proposed recently by Seiden [90]:
• 2009: Supersymmetry if squarks and gluinos have masses around 1 TeV.
• 2009-2010: Higgs boson if its mass is around 180 GeV. A heavy Higgs
mainly decays into W pairs. The discovery may be quick and only require
integrated luminosity of 5-10 fb−1 thanks to the essentially background-
free four-lepton channel H → 4l [43]. If the Higgs has mass in this range,
it may however be discovered by the Tevatron before the LHC.
• 2009: Extra dimensions if gravity scale is around 1 TeV. This will result in
a copious production of mini black holes with a spectacular signature∗, be-
cause evaporation of black holes through the Hawking radiation produces
unique ratios of photons and charged leptons compared to quarks [77, 66].
However, making the distinction between different models with extra di-
mensions will be neither easy nor quick.
• 2009-2011: Z ′ if its mass is around 1 TeV. Evidence of a new U(1) gauge
boson Z ′ with couplings identical to the Standard model levels could be
made with as little as 100 pb−1 of integrated luminosity [84], placing it
as early as 2009. However, the necessity to measure Z ′ couplings and to
distinguish it from other candidate particles will delay confirmation, with
a 3σ result possible at 10 fb−1 of integrated luminosity; a 5σ result with
30 fb−1 [79].
∗Recently doubts have been expressed as for how profuse the production of black holes
may be, if any at all [73].
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• 2010: Simple Randall-Sundrum model will be found or excluded. Warped
extra dimensions have a special signature consisting in resonance produc-
tion of spin-2 gravitons. This makes the RS1 model easily detectable at
the LHC at already 10 fb−1 of integrated luminosity.
• 2010-2011: Higgs boson if its mass is around 120 GeV. Rarity of the
Higgs decay into photon pairs will require more and better statistics than
needed for a heavy Higgs. Thus, the light Higgs will require more than
10 fb−1 of integrated luminosity, which may take up to 3 years of the
LHC operation [44]. Input from both ATLAS and CMS and contribution
of observations from other minor channels will be crucial for distilling a
convincing signal of the light Higgs.
• 2012: Extra dimensions of space if the energy scale is 9 TeV.
The first upgrade of the LHC will take place in 2012 or 2013, leading to a
2 to 3 times increase in luminosity. Decisions with regard to the future of the
machine will hugely depend on the discoveries that the LHC will have made by
then. It may for example happen that the planned second upgrade (10 times
increase in luminosity) will never become reality or be delayed due to political
or financial reasons. Therefore the following long-term estimates are extremely
speculative and only reflect our current knowledge of physics. More accurate
estimates for the LHC functioning after the first upgrade will become possible
by 2012.
• 2013: Compositeness if quarks are actually composite particles instead of
being fundamental and that their composite nature reveals itself on an
energy scale of 40 TeV.
• 2017: Supersymmetry if the appropriate energy scale is 3 TeV.
• 2019: Z ′ if a new strong force comes into play at 6 TeV. Although Z ′
decaying into e+e− is one of the easiest objects to discover at the LHC
already during the first year of operation [43], careful analyses are required
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to distinguish various Z ′ from possible manifestations of new physics which
can have a somewhat similar phenomenology, but a completely different
physical origin [52, p. 62]. For example, signatures similar to composite
Higgs models could be observed in decays of the lightest Kaluza-Klein
excitations in models with large extra dimensions.
• 2019: Extended Randall-Sundrum models with fermions in the bulk. In
such models dominant decay channels of gravitons in the simple RS model
are suppressed [2]. One then needs significantly more precision, including
the measurement of spin 2 of the graviton, which will require an integrated
luminosity of at least 100 fb−1.
5 Symmetry
5.1 Role of symmetry
The 20th century was a “century of symmetry” [71]. At its beginning, Einstein
elevated the principle of invariance to the status of fundamental postulate. A
decade later, Weyl introduced gauge symmetry in an ingenious move consisting
of bringing down to the local level a notion of symmetry previously only thought
of globally, as one symmetry for all space. Weyl was the first to write the
action of a symmetry transformation at individual spacetime points and to
allow this action to depend on the point in question. He was also the first to
treat symmetry groups as relevant to the construction of physical theory. His
use of group theory and of the notion of local gauge invariance have paved the
way to the century of symmetry.
The method of local gauge symmetry was put to practical use by a genera-
tion of young physicists developing quantum theory in 1920s and 1930s. Fock,
Schro¨dinger, Dirac and others have made lasting contributions. Today Weyl
stands together with Eugene Wigner as founding fathers of the modern view
of physics of which symmetry is the cornerstone. Summarized in Weyl’s and
Wigner’s seminal books [104, 106], this view emphasizes two chief aspects of
symmetry (other aspects have also been discussed in the literature [15]).
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First, symmetries have a normative role: they are a priori constraints on
physical theories. We do not derive symmetries from dynamical laws, as did
Poincare´; on the contrary, we postulate symmetries and use them to derive
dynamical laws. Symmetry participates in the dynamics and acquires its own
constitutive power: e.g., symmetry which remains after symmetry breaking in
the process of cosmological evolution is dynamically constituted. This new
power of symmetry required conceptualization. Living at the time when every
major physicist had a serious interest in philosophy, Weyl argued for a revision
of Kantian epistemology which would make room for his claim that “all a priori
statements in physics have their origin in symmetry”. Thus, for Weyl, not only
symmetry is a priori, but all physical a priori stems from symmetry principles.
The latter, as a consequence, take the place of Kantian transcendental categor-
ical basis of science. Wigner, although much less explicitly philosophical than
Weyl, defended a similar view of symmetries when he said that “symmetries are
laws, which the laws of nature have to observe” [107]. Symmetries, for Wigner,
are therefore ‘laws of the laws,’ which is equivalent to Weyl’s assertion that their
normative role can be described as transcendental a priori.
Second, symmetry plays a heuristic role for the construction of modern phys-
ical theories. Gauge theory has been progressing since its introduction by Weyl
in 1918 and has attained the level of an indispensable, if not taken for granted,
element of model building in theoretical physics. Other symmetries, like an
early Heisenberg’s ‘discovery’ of permutation symmetry in 1926, or the CPT
symmetry, shape the form of theories in which they are postulated. Thus, prag-
matically speaking, symmetry principles “dictate the very existence” [103] of all
the known forces of nature. This heuristic role, allowing for the construction of
dynamical laws via established formalisms, gives to symmetry an instrumental
status. By putting together the transcendental a priori role of symmetry and its
heuristic value, one arrives at a transcendental-instrumental view on symmetry
proposed by Ryckman [87].
It is interesting to note that the point of view according to which symmetry is
“the secret of nature” [50] is not unanimous. With respect to global symmetries,
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the opinion that they are “unnatural” is not infrequent [93]. However very
few oppose the role of local symmetries as a postulate describing invariance of
physical phenomena under an abstract, theoretical transformation. Still such
opponents exist; they would like to see symmetry emerge as a property of a
fixed point or an asymptotic solution of the underlying equation which in itself
would have no symmetry [39, 40, 36]. The debate between the two points of
view resorts to subjective arguments about what is more beautiful, but it also
makes the point that the reductionist program associated with the postulation
of symmetries and the consequent derivation of laws has proved more efficient
than the opposite idea of starting with ‘nothing’ and getting ‘something’ [49].
The future will show whether an advanced physical theory is possible that would
not be based on symmetry principles.
5.2 Symmetry breaking
Looking for symmetric solutions to symmetric problems simplifies the construc-
tion of the solution, but there are situations in which the symmetric solutions
are not, in Iliopoulos’s words, “the most interesting ones” [59]. If a symmetry
available in the model is not present in the physical solution of the model’s
equations, then it must be ‘broken’, i.e., the theory must contain a descriptive
account of why the symmetry in question does not exist in the exact sense. There
are two types of mechanisms for symmetry breaking: explicit and spontaneous
symmetry breaking. Both of them emphasize the heuristic role of symmetry in
model building. Indeed, when at the end of the construction symmetry is broken
so that it is completely unobservable, using this very symmetry as an a priori
postulate may simply be empirically inadequate. While not seen by Weyl [104,
pp. 125-126], this argument about empirical inadequacy of a priori constraints
has played a role in the establishment of Friedman’s idea of relativized a pri-
ori [38] and particularly in the discussion initiated by van Fraassen [98]. To save
the symmetry method of model building, one has to provide an explanatory ac-
count of the divergence between empirical reality and the postulates needed for
model construction. Thus, breaking the symmetry while preserving its benefits
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is indeed “the main challenge in model building” [83, p. 8].
In the group-theoretic treatment of symmetry, symmetry breaking amounts
to saying that the system is invariant under the action of a subgroup rather
than the full group corresponding to unbroken symmetry. Symmetry breaking
can therefore be described in mathematical terms through a relation between
transformation groups. This fact provides a natural language for the description
of physical models as possessing such-or-such full symmetry group, broken down
to one or another of its subgroups.
Explicit symmetry breaking occurs in virtue of terms in the Lagrangian of
the system that are not invariant under the considered symmetry group. The
origin of such terms can vary: they could either be introduced manifestly, for
instance in the case of parity violation; or appear as anomalies on the path
from classical to quantum field theory, like violation of chirality; or even appear
in regularization schemes as side effects of the introduction of a cut-off. For
example, collective symmetry breaking is a new concept in symmetry breaking
methods, introduced in the Little Higgs models. It requires two interactions to
explicitly break all symmetries that protect the Higgs mass. At the one-loop
level symmetry breaking does not occur and is only triggered by the second
order terms (see Section 3.3).
Spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) corresponds to situations where sym-
metry is not broken explicitly, but the solution of the equations is however not
symmetric. In gauge theory, the choice of the solution is typically the choice of
a particular ground state of the theory, which is not invariant under the symme-
try transformation. The original symmetry, although broken, is still ‘hidden’,
meaning that we cannot predict which non-symmetric ground state will be cho-
sen. Thus, this choice is not a dynamical process in the sense of unitary time
evolution. Viewed strictly from within quantum field theory, SSB is a not a
process at all: ‘breaking’ only occurs in the theorist’s mind when he writes,
first, a QFT Lagrangian with exact symmetry and then another, different QFT
Lagrangian, where this symmetry is broken. The two lagrangians aren’t con-
nected by physics. They do not correspond to the descriptions of some system
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either at earlier and later times or as synchronic or diachronic cause and ef-
fect, as Curie’s principle would require [11, 62].∗ Strictly within QFT, SSB
and time evolution are unrelated. Thus, SSB becomes here but a mere tool for
model building, providing a strong case in favour of the instrumental approach
to symmetry in quantum field theory.
To take a typical example, the full symmetry in a model containing left and
right fermions corresponds to group SU(2)L × SU(2)R. Right-handed fermions
are not a part of the observed reality and must be excluded from the Standard
Model. Spontaneous symmetry breaking then consists in giving a non-zero vac-
uum expectation value (vev) to the Higgs doublet that exists in this general
model; it leads to reducing the full symmetry group down to the diagonal sub-
group SU(2)V called custodial symmetry. The choice of a particular vev for the
Higgs boson cannot be predicted theoretically and must be deduced from exper-
imental data. Once determined, the vev appears explicitly in the Lagrangian of
the new QFT with broken symmetry.
A philosophical question about symmetry breaking is why we search for a
way to obtain a symmetric, rather than asymmetric, laws and why we assign the
observed asymmetry to solutions, not directly to laws [32]. As Kosso puts it,
“Why not just give up on the idea of gauge symmetry for the weak interaction,
given the evidence that it is not gauge invariant? Is there good reason for
the commitment to the gauge principle. . . even if that symmetry is hidden in all
circumstances?” [64]† Another way to ask the same question would be to wonder
at a paradoxically sounding but precise phrase by David Gross: “The search for
new symmetries of nature is based on the possibility of finding mechanisms,
such as spontaneous symmetry breaking or confinement, that hide the new
∗Numerous discussions of symmetry in physics focus on Curie’s principle and argue some-
times that spontaneous symmetry breaking provides an argument against it [16]. In our view,
strictly quantum field theoretic SSB is irrelevant for the analysis of Curie’s principle. Simi-
larly, claims that SSB represents a “failure of determinism” [31] cannot be grounded in the
pure quantum field theory but require an additional speculative cosmological model.
†With respect to the weak interaction the answer is that we need gauge invariance in
order to obtain a renormalizable theory. The question still holds in the general sense: why,
conceptually, do we need to use quantum field theoretic models, like Yang-Mills with its
divergences and the necessity of gauge symmetry to avoid them, rather than using a theory
which would not postulate a symmetry only to break it at the next stage of model building?
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symmetry” [50, our emphasis].
Castellani following Earman provides a useful insight by connecting this
question with Curie’s assertion that the absence of certain elements of symmetry,
or dissymmetry, is what creates the phenomenon [31, 23]. The normative a priori
role of symmetry as ‘law of the laws’ places it in the transcendental background,
making symmetry the condition of possibility of lawfulness in physics. No law
is possible other than determined by, and derived from, a symmetry.
This transcendental argument, which sets up the condition of possibility of
lawfulness, needs explication. Physical law is what applies to many individ-
ual experimental cases, of which it provides a uniform, and unified, treatment.
There cannot be a law without the existence, by postulation, of common fea-
tures among these diverse experimental situations. If there had been no common
trait between them, no method nor language for making the comparison between
disparate occurrences, then indeed no unification of these occurrences would be
possible. Symmetry is the tool that we employ to name these common traits and
to manipulate them within a theory, whereby we establish connections between
them under symmetry transformations. Thus, symmetry becomes unavoidable
if one is willing to unify physical theories.
It is for those who represent physics as a series of theoretical unifications
that the symmetry group obtains the transcendental meaning given to it by
Weyl. Now, it is individual phenomena that are governed by the law estab-
lished with the help of a priori symmetry. We have postulated the existence
of common traits between them. As in the case with a priori constraints, this
postulate may not always be empirically adequate. If we are interested in a sin-
gle given phenomenon, or an individual solution of the equations of a physical
model, there is no reason why this particular occurrence would be completely
described by the features that had previously been identified as common to a
class of phenomena. It may well be that the complete description require the use
of unique properties, which do not transform under the symmetry group or even
aren’t subject to physical law. Therefore, in the description of a unique phe-
nomenon we must be ready to encounter unique descriptive elements alongside
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lawful properties stemming from the considerations of symmetry.
Complete description of a particular phenomenon may be unpredictable.
One usual example is the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. The
value observed in a given measurement is random although the quantum system
evolves on the lawful background of unitary dynamics. Predictions of the theory
are probabilistic and do not completely determine the result of any one given
measurement.
From the cosmological point of view where it is treated as a dynamical
process, spontaneous symmetry breaking in the EW sector is another example
of unlawful feature of the particular Universe in which we live, although this
Universe is described by the physical law based on symmetry. The earlier state
with the full a priori symmetry is physically lawful, and to generate a unique
case we must resort to chance. Thus, from the point of view of cosmological
evolution, the Higgs vev is what it is in nature very much like the result of one
particular measurement in quantum mechanics is what it is; the theory does
not predict it. To summarize, dynamically perceived spontaneous symmetry
breaking is a manifestation of the unlawful uniqueness of a particular solution.
We frame it to the largest possible extent in a rigorous mathematical setting,
which describes the symmetry breaking mechanism and leaves us with one bare
unpredictable number that only the experimental data will supply. Healey’s sin-
cere predicament before the failure to find a satisfactory dynamical explanation
of the Higgs mechanism is but an indication that the purpose of this mechanism
is to provide a description of the unlawful randomness [55, p. 174].
5.3 Naturalness and symmetry
Arguments from naturalness have dominated QFT research in a very significant
way in the last 25 years. The first historic notion of naturalness in particle
physics, formulated by Gerard ’t Hooft, connects it with symmetry:
The naturalness criterion states that one such [dimensionless and
measured in units of the cut-off] parameter is allowed to be much
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smaller than unity only if setting it to zero increases the symmetry
of the theory. If this does not happen, the theory is unnatural. [96]
The connection with symmetry could have allegedly provided a philosophical
background for naturalness, based on the transcendental justification of sym-
metry; this did not happen. The notion has evolved, and its current meaning
is rarely justified differently than by saying that naturalness is a “question of
aesthetics” [29] or “the sense of ‘aesthetic beauty’ is a powerful guiding princi-
ple for physicists” [45]. For sure, arguments from beauty such as they appear
when one speaks of naturalness in natural science may turn out to be either
extraordinarily fruitful or completely misleading. Polkinghorne, for example,
discusses at length the power of beauty in mathematics [81]. However, what
he calls “rational beauty” and applies to physics rather than mathematics can
only be admired post factum, i.e., when we have established a sound scientific
account in agreement with nature. For the universe is not just beautiful; one
can also discern in it ‘futility’ [101] or inefficiency [30]. Thus, using beauty as
a guidance rule, prior to verification of the theory against experimental data,
is logically unsound and heuristically doubtful. It can at best be warranted by
arguments from design.
The first modern meaning of naturalness is a reformulation of the hierar-
chy problem. This arises from the fact that masses of scalar particles are not
protected against quantum corrections, and keeping a hierarchical separation
between the scale of EW symmetry breaking and the Planck scale requires the
existence of some mechanism that would naturally explain such a hierarchy. Al-
though the difference in hierarchies is a dimensionless parameter much smaller
than unity ( 10
3GeV
1019GeV = 10
−16), setting it to zero is out of question because grav-
ity exists even if it is weak (one exception from this argument are models with
large extra dimensions, where the scale of gravity is different from 1019 GeV).
With all its known problems, the Standard Model does not become more sym-
metric in the hypothetical case where gravity is infinitely weaker than weak
interactions. Thus, ’t Hooft’s criterion does not apply, and the notion of nat-
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uralness as the hierarchy problem indeed differs from the one he defined. This
new meaning of naturalness leads to the use of fine-tuning arguments and will
be further discussed in Section 7.
For Giudice [45, p. 9-10, 20], the second ingredient of the naturalness crite-
rion is the use of effective field theories. He claims that “if the experiments at
the LHC find no new phenomena linked to the TeV scale, the naturalness cri-
terion would fail and the explanation of the hierarchy between electroweak and
gravitational scales would be beyond the reach of effective field theories. But if
new particles at the TeV scale are indeed discovered, it will be a triumph for
our understanding of physics in terms of symmetries and effective field theories.”
Effective field theories and their role will be discussed in Section 6.
Thus, the word ‘naturalness’ is used in several non-equivalent situations and
can have different meanings depending on the authors. One example is however
commonly agreed as a test for the naturalness criterion. Split supersymmetry
is a high-energy SUSY scenario, which abandons naturalness for the use of an
anthropic argument requiring that at low-energy the theory allow the existence
of complex chemistry (atoms other than hydrogen). It is also required that
the lightest supersymmetric particle, a neutralino, provide the dark matter of
the universe. In split supersymmetry squarks and sleptons are made heavy,
maintaining the predictions of gauge-coupling unification, but discarding a too
light Higgs, fast proton decay and the flavour problem [46]. This scenario is
argued to have a detectable experimental signature, in particular through its
CP-violating mechanism. If found at the LHC, split supersymmetry will pro-
vide tangible experimental evidence against use of the aesthetically motivated
naturalness criterion in physics.
6 Effective field theory
6.1 EFT approach
The notion of renormalizability in the context of quantum field theory (QFT)
and its early representatives like quantum electrodynamics (QED) was devel-
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oped by Bethe, Schwinger, Tomonaga, Feynman, and Dyson. The latter intro-
duced crucial power-counting techniques for the analysis of operator relevance.
Since his 1949 work and up to 1970s renormalizability had been thought of as
a necessary condition for a quantum field theory to make sense. Wilson’s work
on the renormalization group has paved the way to a change of attitude toward
renormalizability. This was mainly due to a change of attitude toward the real-
ity of the renormalization cut-off. In the older understanding, the cut-off scale
was a residue of abstract mathematics introduced with the only goal of avoid-
ing infinities in summation series. The new appreciation of non-renormalizable
theories came with the understanding that the cut-off could be taken as phys-
ical and corresponding to the limit of applicability of a given theory. Thus
the domain of applicability of QFTs has become clearly limited by a number
denoting an energy scale. QFTs started to be seen as effective field theories
(EFTs) valid up to some frontier rather than fundamental theories of nature.
Wilson’s work and Weinberg’s reintroduction of EFTs as useful theories with
‘phenomenological Lagrangians’ [99, 100, 102] boosted this new view on EFTs.
Much of the historic development of EFTs focused on the top-down ap-
proach, where the fundamental physical theory is known but is inapplicable for
practical purposes. These may be due to complexity of the high-energy theory
or, as in the case of EFT in condensed matter physics, “Even when one knows
the theory at a microscopic level (i.e., the fundamental theory), there is often
a good reason to deliberately move away to an effective theory” [91]. A typi-
cal example from particle physics is the chiral perturbation theory, which gives
a low-energy approximation of quantum chromodynamics (QCD) in the light
quark sector (for a review see [80]). But the top-down approach has a longer
history: one of its first examples involves the Euler-Heisenberg calculation in
the 1930s of photon-photon scattering at small energies within the framework
of Dirac’s quantum field theory.
The LHC physics uses a different EFT approach, sometimes called ‘bottom-
up’. Its popularity reflects a change in the way in which EFTs are now conceived.
Today physicists tend to think of all physical theories, including the Standard
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Model, as EFTs with respect to new physics at higher energies.
A typical model-building scenario, following Wilson, starts with Lagrangian
of an effective field theory (EFT) valid up to scale Λ. This Lagrangian can be
generally written as a sum over local operator products:
L =
∞∑
n=0
λn
Λn
On. (7)
Coefficients λn are coupling constants. They encode information on the physics
at scales higher than Λ and can be fixed experimentally or through a calculation
by the renormalization group if the underlying high-energy theory is known.
The only constraints on the form of operator product terms On come from
symmetries of the theory.
The main value of Lagrangian (7) for the LHC physics is that one can use
it to study low-energy effects of new physics beyond the SM without having to
specify what this new physics actually is. Tree level of the power series in 1Λ is
obtained by the usual Standard Model calculation. Effects of new physics appear
in loop corrections and influence the value of coupling constants λn. Thus, after
the concept of symmetry, that of EFT is the second most important instrument
for the construction of new models to be tested at the LHC. A disadvantage
is that it does not allow us to establish correlations of new physics effects at
low and high energies. The number of correlations among different low-energy
observables is also very limited, unless some restrictive assumptions about the
structure of the EFT are employed [61, p. 2].
For example, consider a ‘top-down’ electroweak EFT that reproduces the
SM for the light degrees of freedom (light quarks, leptons and gauge bosons)
as long as energies involved are small compared with the Higgs mass [80]. This
EFT is Higgless in the sense that it cuts off the Higgs sector by choice of Λ.
The lowest order effective Lagrangian fixes the masses of Z and W bosons at
tree level and does not carry information on the underlying symmetry breaking
SU(2)L×U(1)Y → U(1)QED. At the next order the most general effective chiral
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Lagrangian with only gauge bosons and Goldstone fields,
L(4)EW =
14∑
i=0
aiOi, (8)
contains 15 independent operators. This complexity is essential as it stems from
the requirement that we use the most general form of the Lagrangian compat-
ible with symmetry principles. Gell-Mann has even formulated this rule as a
“totalitarian principle” which states that everything which is not forbidden is
compulsory [13]. Weinberg insists that absence of any assumption of simplicity
about the Lagrangian is what makes EFT so efficient [103, p. 246]. For La-
grangian (8), constraints from symmetry include invariance with respect to CP
and SU(2)L×U(1)Y . Also, three of the fifteen operators vanish as a consequence
of the equations of motion under the assumption of light fermions. With the
remaining terms, one finds various effects such as the usual electroweak oblique
corrections (6 operators involved at the bilinear, 4 at the trilinear and 5 at the
quartic levels), corrections to rare B and K decays, the CP -violating parame-
ter, etc. Thus, the approximation of a very large Higgs mass in the SM gives an
EFT which possesses predictive power, providing a simpler than the complete
SM way to make calculations.
6.2 Philosophy of EFT
Three philosophical ideas quickly come to mind with respect to EFT. These
have been discussed since a somewhat controversial early study by Cao and
Schweber [19, 20] and form today the core of the philosophical debate. Cao
and Schweber argued that EFT commits one to ontological pluralism, antire-
ductionism and antifoundationalism.
Ontological pluralism is a form of realism which stipulates the view of real-
ity as a tower of quasi-autonomous layers, each of which can be described by a
physical theory without reference to the underlying layer. Not only this realist
point of view can be criticized [85, 54], but the layer autonomy is in itself doubt-
ful. While the latter is admitted for all practical purposes in model building,
physics shows that there is no obvious decoupling of the layers unless we are
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in possession of a high-energy renormalizable theory. A theorem by Appelquist
and Carazzone states that in a renormalizable high-energy theory with exact
gauge symmetry, a low-energy EFT can be given without reference to massive
particles at the price of rewriting the Lagrangian with renormalized coupling
constants [4]. However, decoupling of the levels does not necessarily arise in the-
ories with spontaneously broken symmetry, where mass generation through the
mechanism of symmetry breaking is associated with interaction terms. Because
of this, and with the acceptance of non-renormalizability as unpathological fea-
ture of QFTs, strict decoupling has become less important. It was replaced by
a milder form of the decoupling thesis suitable for use of the EFT method in
the description of new physics effects at energies of the order of 1 TeV. Thus, in
the LHC physics, decoupling of the levels is not warranted by theory; it is only
grounded in the empirical fact that the SM predictions correspond very well to
the experimental data, and with respect to them any corrections coming from
new physics must remain minor. Hence, it is hypothesized that the NP layer de-
couples from the electroweak scale. Mildness of this empirical decoupling thesis
leaves open a possibility of its breakdown, i.e., of a tension between the levels
leading to problems with formulation of the effective theory. One such tension
is exactly reflected in the little hierarchy problem.
If the claim of ontological pluralism made by Cao and Schweber appears
too far-fetched, their antireductionism argument has produced a lively debate
(see [57, 22]). As Shankar puts it, “Often the opponents of EFT or even its
practitioners feel they are somehow compromising” [91]. One thus finds physi-
cists who argue for a reductionist perspective on EFT; for instance, Giudice
writes unabashedly, “Effective field theories are a powerful realization of the
reductionist approach” [45]. Others, e.g., Georgi, are more cautious and anti-
reductionist. What emerges, although not without disagreement, is that EFT
enables the argument that fundamentality of theories is a provisional, almost
uninteresting attribute. The tower of EFTs effectively leads to the renunciation
of the search for a complete description of new physics. This renunciation is nei-
ther hic et nunc nor circumstantial. It is a methodological anti-foundationalist
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stance opening a way to do high-energy physics without having to search for a
unified theory.
Eventually the fundamental theory will have to surface. If it does not, then
we’ll be left with a tower of EFTs. This tower will not inherit all the method-
ological advantages that an individual EFT, useful in calculations, has over
a yet-to-be-found fundamental theory. The tower will become complicated as
significantly more higher-dimensional operators will appear at higher orders in
Λ. To respond to the continuing demand of accounting for new minor details,
EFTs will have to be supplied with additional parameters. As a result, for
Hartmann, “the predictive power [of the EFT tower] will go down just as the
predictive power of the Ptolemaic system went down when more epicycles were
added” [54, p. 296]. Perhaps even more vividly than Ptolemaic epicycles, doubts
about the significance of theories based on postulated principles, viz. symmetry
principles or the decoupling, have been expressed by Einstein.
After his paper describing the photoelectric effect in terms of light quanta,
Einstein’s belief in the fundamental character and the exact validity of Maxwell’s
electrodynamics was destabilized. As he wrote in his 1949 Autobiographical
Notes,
Reflections of this type [on the dual wave-particle nature of radi-
ation] made it clear to me as long ago as shortly after 1900, i.e.,
shortly after Plancks trailblazing work, that neither mechanics nor
electrodynamics could (except in limiting cases) claim exact validity.
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws
by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. [33, p. 51, 53]
Einstein’s desperation has led him to propose special relativity. The price to be
paid was a retreat to the principle theory approach, described by Einstein in
1919 as the opposite of ‘constructive efforts’. Already since 1908 Einstein had
expressed his concern with principle theories, based on postulated principles,
as being in some respect ‘less fundamental’ than constructive theories based on
“known facts”. This was mainly due to Einstein’s urgent feeling of a necessity
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to provide a theory that would describe rods and clocks, viz., the measurement
apparatus of special relativity, on equal grounds with other physical systems.
Current debate on principle theories has been focused on this question [17, 48],
overlooking the following different aspect of Einstein’s 1905 situation.
Einstein’s hope was to construct a new theory based on known facts. Facts
however proved to be insufficient: “It was if the ground had been pulled out
from under one, with no firm foundation to be seen anywhere, upon which one
could have built” [33, p. 45]. So Einstein resorted to what seemed to him a
less fundamental, lighter foundation for theoretical physics. On the example of
thermodynamics, he elevated the relativity principle to the status of universal
postulate and derived the theory of special relativity. Similarly, with the LHC
physics we are in a situation when known facts are as yet insufficient for the
construction of a new theory. We have then chosen a less fundamental EFT
approach based on general principles rather than known facts.
Unlike Einstein, whose special relativity has enjoyed a long life, new facts
that will soon be available may terminate our doubts and lay the missing em-
pirical basis on which a new physical theory will be chosen. Still, according to
the EFT view, although the new theory will describe all known facts, we should
take it as a limited effective solution with respect to unknown physics at yet
higher energies. At the same time, the status of our current ‘bottom-up’ EFTs,
which we use in absence of the more fundamental theory, will be downshifted
after its advent. Their use will be severely limited and they will stay as mon-
uments to the physicists’ perseverence. There will be no tower of EFTs: new
EFTs may be used for physics at yet higher energies, but older EFTs will lie as
ruined stones torn down from the tower. Furthermore, if one day we discover a
unique full theory that wouldn’t use QFT methods, then our idea of bottom-up
EFT may be altogether wrong.
6.3 Pragmatic view of EFT
The most appealing modification of the ontological pluralism thesis was pro-
posed by Hartmann. Based on a discussion of Georgi’s writings, he argues that
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a viable solution to the troubles of ontological pluralism would be to regard EFT
as purely pragmatic, without seeing in it a commitment either to reductionism
or to anti-reductionism. When Georgi writes,
In addition to being a great convenience, effective field theory allows
us to ask all the really scientific questions that we want to ask with-
out committing ourselves to a picture of what happens at arbitrarily
high energy, [41]
he means by “all the really scientific questions” that EFT is a pragmatic ap-
proach to the unknown new physics which is focused only on its effects observ-
able as corrections to the SM predictions for the experiments at our current
technological reach. The pragmatic strategy would then consist in focusing on
these corrections as having the primary importance. All other content of new
physics is neglected and other ‘really scientific questions’ that one may have
with regard to new physics are not taken into account. This evokes a parallel,
emphasized by Weinberg, between EFT and the theory of S-matrix. Indeed,
the S-matrix approach only asked ‘practical’ questions about the yet unknown
theory of strong interactions, formulated in the language of physical observ-
ables, and methodically avoided the need to have a full theory. In the LHC
physics the unknown is not the theory of strong and weak interactions but new
physics beyond the SM. With little prospect for distinguishing in the near fu-
ture between the different alternatives for this new physics, EFT allows us to
develop a consciously and purposefully model-independent approach, where all
that matters about the new unknown physics are its observable effects.
This is not the full story though. The analogy with the S-matrix suggests
that there exists an aspect in the EFT approach to new physics at the LHC that
has a counterpart in the S-matrix case but has none in other, ‘top-down’ uses of
EFT like the chiral perturbation theory. In 1950s it has not been clear whether
QFT with its gauge symmetry method was an appropriate framework for build-
ing a theory of strong interactions∗. The hope of S-matrix, writes Weinberg,
∗A very telling example of this is a 1954 (same year as the work by Yang and Mills)
discussion involving, among others, Oppenheimer, Gell-Mann, Fermi, Wick, and Dyson, in
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“was that, by using principles of unitarity, analyticity, Lorentz invariance and
other symmetries, it would be possible to calculate the S-matrix, and you would
never have to think about a quantum field...” [103, p. 248]. This is in complete
analogy with the situation with EFT, whereby the terms in the Lagrangian must
be written in the most general form compatible with symmetry principles. Just
as S-matrix allows one not to “think about a quantum field”, EFT relieves one
from the need to worry about physical content of the high-energy theory.
While Weinberg says that “the S-matrix philosophy is not far from the mod-
ern philosophy of effective field theories”, he adds with respect to the former that
“more important than any philosophical hang-ups was the fact that quantum
field theory didn’t seem to be going anywhere in accounting for the strong and
weak interactions”. So S-matrix was not only an attempt to formulate theories
exclusively in terms of observable quantities. It was equally a reaction to the
situation in which no one knew what language to use, and in which direction to
look, for theories of strong and weak interactions. Much like today we have no
idea whether supersymmetry, or extra dimensions, or something else, will turn
out to be the right solution for new physics, physicists in the early 1960s did
not agree on the language needed for formulating what had for them been new
physics. In the absence of any agreed-upon idea for new physics at the LHC,
we resort to the language that does not require one to have such an idea. Both
for us and for physicists working on the S-matrix, new physics may turn out
something completely new and wild. Our path to tackling this unknown is EFT.
In both cases, quantum field theory and its method based on symmetries is but
one alternative framework; for the theories of weak and strong interactions this
alternative has proven correct. Today we continue to use it in SUSY models;
but there is no guarantee that QFT will again prove to be the correct language.
One upshot of the analogy between S-matrix and EFT is that today, when
the S-matrix theory of strong interactions has been superseded by QCD, we
know where it has gone wrong: its emphasis on analyticity as fundamental
which Goldberger challenged the applicability of QFT methods to nuclear interactions and
nobody in the audience spoke clearly to the contrary [76]. This example was still remembered
in the 1970s as a typical case of the early doubts about the future of QFT [3].
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principle was misguided, because no one could ever state the detailed analyt-
icity properties of general S-matrix elements. Perhaps something like this is
happening today with EFT and the model-independent analysis of new physics.
Some of the symmetries that we postulate and impose on the Lagrangian in
eq. (7) may turn out to be blinding us rather than leading to a result which will
ultimately emerge as the correct one.
7 Chance and the establishment of physical the-
ory
7.1 Probabilistic reasoning
Human beings engage in probabilistic reasoning more or less constantly, whether
knowingly or not. We sometimes reason probabilistically in ways that suit our
purposes very well and at other times we do rather poorly in this regard [75].
This constant engagement in probabilistic reasoning is due to the fact that in the
face of growing complexity of today’s world we often look for a simple heuristic
that short-cuts unwanted complications in the decision making process. Proba-
bilistic reasoning is the main such heuristic thanks to its rigorous mathematical
methods. To calculate probabilities is reassuring. Whether one takes such calcu-
lation as reflecting objective frequencies of event occurrence or mere subjective
degrees of belief, the sheer act of making the calculation and the reliance upon
it have become a common tool for the justification of action in many areas of
human endeavour. Furthermore, over and beyond its heuristic use, probabilistic
reasoning has to some extent acquired the power of explanation. We form scien-
tifically informed subjective probabilities about a future unique event, such as
the climate change; we then consider action that could reduce or enlarge these
probabilities as if they could explain why the future event will have occurred.
Not only do we refer to probabilistic reasoning to justify our own action, but we
do so in cases where human beings have no causal role to play. Nature herself is
represented as a subject making her choice between different options, each with
a probabilistic weight attached.
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Probabilistic reasoning has started its journey into the general public’s mind
from its place in the scientific analysis of complex systems, e.g., in statistical
physics. Rigorous accounts of individual processes or mechanisms forming a
complex system and contributing to its large-scale, emergent behaviour require
exceedingly large memory and exceedingly large computing power. Faced with
these problems, 19th-century physics was the first discipline to give scientific
validity to mathematical methods of probability. Social scientists, such as econo-
mists and sociologists, have been quick to follow.
The inherent impossibility of unquestionable causal determinism in social
science obviously weakens the claims of social scientists for rigor and, conse-
quently, their status as true scientists. This lack of causality was compensated
for, and successfully, by the mass propagation of probabilistic ‘explanations’.
These were applied in all areas with a decision-making subject facing uncer-
tainty. In such contexts, typically, some information would be available to the
subject before his decision is made, and further information could flow in. The
Bayes theory provided a useful and legitimate tool for calculating and justifying
optimal choice. This legitimate use of probabilistic reasoning was extended to
situations where one is concerned with unique events, i.e., situations where no
subject has at any time had the power to enact a different future. The choice
would be then justified and dubbed ‘correct’ based on the same probabilistic
reasoning, although alternative scenarios now become merely fictitious games
of imagination. Psychologically, the public perceive today as scientific and,
therefore, sound any explanation based on probabilities. To persuade the lay-
man, one frequently gives an argument containing percentages which are easy
to compare, while wilfully preserving the mystery around the origin of these
numbers.
Historically the only clear-cut case of a marked departure from the determin-
istic paradigm of causal explanation in physics was the theory of measurement
in quantum mechanics. The wave function describes only a distribution of prob-
abilities for a quantum measurement and cannot predict the exact result to be
obtained in a given act of measurement. Taken outside the statistical series of
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repeated measurements, a given observation yields a random result. Lawlike
generalizations, as described by the laws of quantum theory, are only possible
with respect to repeated identical measurements.
The concept of spontaneous symmetry breaking, applied in cosmology, marked
a new departure from the deterministic paradigm in theoretical physics. Sim-
ilarly to the situation with quantum measurement, the choice of a particular
symmetry-breaking ground state among many in the history of the Universe
was a matter of chance. It cannot be implemented by the unitary dynamics of
the theory [88, 58]. Spontaneous symmetry breaking being a useful and suc-
cessful tool in constructing models, physicists often do not fully appreciate the
fact that it poses conceptual problems of interpretation [86, 55, 32].
The cases of quantum measurement and spontaneous symmetry breaking
represent two situations where randomness is an integral part of the best scien-
tific explanation we can produce. Science however has not been shielded from
the tendency to use probabilistic reasoning far from its primary domain of ap-
plication. Thus, probabilistic reasoning has made its way to ‘explaining away’
more scientific conundrums. In the case of several problems in cosmology and
in particle physics, while doubt was growing that science may ever solve them
by causal explanation, an argument based on probabilistic reasoning is often
accepted as a sufficient and satisfactory answer. The question belongs with the
methodology and the philosophy of science, whether the new method of expla-
nation is sound. In the LHC physics it makes its appearance in the use of the
fine tuning argument.
7.2 Fine tuning
The Higgs mechanism of the Standard Model is based on an improbable fit
of electroweak data, with less than 2% overlap between EW precision tests,
and sometimes a direct contradiction. Alternative models do not fare much
better. The supersymmetric models agree with the EW data only if their free
parameters are tuned at the level of few percent [45, p. 15]. The amount of
fine tuning in the Little Higgs models is similar. As it is schematically shown
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on Figure 6, there is no simple model without any tuning remaining in the
valid model space. Still, notwithstanding such ‘improbability’, physicists do not
hurry to reject the Higgs mechanism as a working solution for the EW symmetry
breaking. Why? The issue is with the meaning of ‘improbable’ in the fine-tuning
argument.
-
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Figure 6: Schematic graph of fine tuning versus model complexity in the space
of models beyond SM [25].
To say that a highly fine-tuned model is improbable is an argument from
probabilistic reasoning. It has the merit of having the form of a perfectly normal
pattern of scientific argument [92]. Thus, its conclusion is likely to be taken for
true without a second thought. Instigation to further reflection is then needed
to avoid a flaw in argumentation.
A usual philosophical justification of the fine-tuning argument is given via
distributing probabilities over many ontologically interpreted worlds. This justi-
fication inserts the fine-tuning argument in a larger class of anthropic arguments
based on the many-worlds reasoning. Among all possible worlds, those contain-
ing highly fine-tuned models are probabilistically rare. Compared to the full
number of worlds, their proportion is tiny, and reflects the amount of fine tun-
ing in the model. Therefore, if ‘we’ evaluate ‘our’ chances to be in such a world,
the resulting estimate will be low. Depending on the concrete variety of the
anthropic argument, the pronoun ‘we’ here alternatively refers either to intelli-
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gent beings, or worlds with carbon-based life, or worlds with complex chemical
elements, etc. In this ontological reasoning, everything happens as if there were
a choice-making subject called Nature or God who would blindly decide to put
us in a world of her choice. Thrown so unto one world of many, our task being
to predict where we shall end up, we cannot do better than use probabilities.
The ontological scenario seems totally fictitious, but it is the one shared
intuitively by many physicists [21]. Particle physicists start by arguing that
the contradictions in the EW precision data render the SM Higgs mechanism
less compelling. They represent these contradictions as a numerical percentage
supposedly denoting a probability for the SM to be true. Going beyond SM,
they argue that a large amount of fine tuning in any physical model makes it also
less compelling. They refer to naturalness and argue that their argument has a
rigorous meaning given by the rejection as fine-tuned of any model where the
bare value of a physical constant and quantum corrections result in a measured
value that differs from them by many orders of magnitude. It is at this point
that the argument is not obvious. The two parts of it: with respect to SM and
with respect to models beyond SM, are not completely analogous.
In the first case, it is legitimate to claim that the observed experimental
inconsistencies may question the validity of the theory. This is precisely be-
cause we have certainty with regard to the existing data (including error in real
measurements of real physical constants).
In the second case, the same argument based on the same data is used to
imply a little more. At the level of logic of the argument, what is at play is not a
mere calculation of a degree of rarity on the background of many possible worlds.
Fine tuning becomes a tool for comparing models and forming preferences with
respect to one or another of them:
Some existing models. . . are not elevated to the position of supersym-
metric standard models by the community. That may be because
they involve fine-tunings. . . [14]
The focus point region of mSUGRA model is especially compelling
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in that heavy scalar masses can co-exist with low fine-tuning. . . [8,
our emphasis]
We . . . find preferable ratios which reduce the degree of fine tun-
ing. [1, our emphasis]
. . . the fine-tuning price of LEP. . . [10, our emphasis]
The physicist using the fine-tuning argument with regard to theories beyond
SM makes a bet on his future state of knowledge. We do not know what the
correct theory will be. There will however be one and only one such true theory.
We believe that the LHC will help us to decide which of the existing alternatives
is true, and we therefore believe that at some point in the future, hopefully soon
enough, we shall know what the correct theory is. In this situation of uncertainty
with respect to our future state of knowledge, we cannot fare better than put
bets, in the form of subjective probabilities, with respect to this unknown unique
state of knowledge. Such subjective probabilities are scientifically informed,
meaning that they agree with the best of our scientific knowledge expressed as
percentage of fine tuning of different models. They are however subjective in the
sense of referring to a unique future state of knowledge whose uncertainty, from
today’s point of view, only allows one trial after which the correct answer will be
unveiled once and for all. Thus, the fine-tuning argument is a way to calculate
numeric values of the bets that we place on the future state of knowledge.
Like in the general case of probabilistic reasoning, the role of fine-tuning
argument is often extended to providing an explanation as for why the future
state of knowledge will have come about in its unique future form. This use
of the fine-tuning argument is a psychological aberration and should be clearly
identified as non-scientific. Thus, the fine-tuning argument is not a problem
in and by itself; its true role is however limited. For example, Rattazzi asks
if we should “really worry” about fine tuning [83, p. 5]. He then argues that
perhaps not, but “we should keep in mind that once we are willing to accept
some tuning, the motivation for New Physics at the LHC becomes weaker”.
This “motivation” is clearly connected not with explaining away new physics,
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but with betting on the future unique state of knowledge: when numeric value of
probability becomes smaller, our bet is less likely to win. If we agree that betting
could not help to explain away new physics, we are left free to imagine that
‘improbable’ scenarios may be realized, including those in which sparticles are
out of reach at the LHC or the SM Higgs mechanism itself avoids contradictions
in the EW data.
Psychologically, it is very difficult to resist the temptation and refuse to
make a guess at the future state of knowledge. Donoghue’s suggestion that we
simply “live with the existence of fine tuning” promises a hard way of life [29].
Its difficulty though is not completely unfamiliar as we already live in a world
with many fine tunings, for example:
• The apparent angular size of the Moon is the same as the an-
gular size of the Sun within 2.5%.
• The recount of the US presidential election results in Florida in
2000 had the official result of 2913321 Republican vs. 2913144
Democratic votes, with the ratio equal to 1.000061, i.e., fine-
tuned to one with the precision of 0.006%.
• The ratio of 987654321 to 123456789 is equal to 8.000000073,
i.e., eight with the precision of 9.1× 10−9. In this case, unlike
in the previous two which are mere coincidences, there is a
‘hidden’ principle in number theory which is responsible for
the large amount of fine tuning. [65]
Once we accept to place bets, it is difficult to imagine that on the day when
the future state of knowledge will have come about, our own Gedankenspiel will
not be judged retrospectively as having had a causal effect on, and therefore the
power of explanation of, that particular state. In this future situation, thanks
to the LHC experimental data, the correct physical theory beyond SM that
we shall have discovered will be not merely possible, but necessary. The fine-
tuning argument as it is used today to compare different models will have lost
all interest.
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7.3 Counterfactual reasoning
It is essential to understand the precise structure of the fine-tuning argument.
To say that a fine-tuned model is improbable, hence it must be rejected, as-
sumes that one can give a meaning to ‘improbable’. Calculations of the degree
of improbability lead to numbers expressed as a certain percentage. Such cal-
culations of probability can only be sound if there were behind the fine-tuning
argument a normalizable probability distribution of the fine-tuned property in
some ensemble H. Whether such a distribution can be defined is open to debate.
Normalizability is one problem: the difficulty lies with the fact that most at-
tempts to rigorously define the ‘parameter space’ lead to its non-normalizability.
In this case, ratios between regions of the space cannot be established [72]. Rig-
orous definition of ensemble H another problem. For example, when Athron
and Miller discuss the measures of fine tuning in SUSY models, they claim that
“our fundamental notion of fine tuning [is] a measure of how atypical a sce-
nario is” [7]. One wonders what meaning could ‘atypical’ have in absence of
a well-defined ensemble on which a probability distribution could be defined.
To introduce probability, all parameter values must be treated as potentially
realizable. This in turn involves postulating a distribution of parameter values
over many worlds, each of which has a definite set of these values. Thus, the
mere need to define H pushes in the direction of the many-worlds ontology.
The fine-tuning argument shares with a larger class of anthropic arguments
a twofold logical nature: these arguments can either be formulated in purely
indicative terms or by using counterfactuals. The first kind of formulations, us-
ing only indicative terms, are typically employed by opponents of the anthropic
principle [94]. They mean to dissolve the apparent explanatory power of the
argument by rewording it in terms of facts and of the laws of inference in classic
Boolean logic. Devoid of the counterfactual, the anthropic argument indeed
becomes trivial.
The second kind of logic involving explicit counterfactuals is more common.
Anthropic arguments take the form of statements like ‘If parameters were differ-
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ent then intelligent life would not have existed”; or ‘If parameters were different
then complex chemistry would not have existed’; or ‘If parameters were different
then carbon-based life would not be possible’. What is most often discussed in
the literature with respect to such statements is whether they can be taken as
arguments having the power to explain physics. What is often overlooked is the
more general but no less fundamental problem of validity and applicability of
the counterfactual logical structure.
Counterfactuals in physics have been discussed at least since the Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen paper about quantum mechanics in 1935 [34]. The key
point in the EPR argument is in the wording: “If. . . we had chosen another
quantity. . . we should have obtained. . . ”. The Kochen-Specker theorem and
Specker’s discussion of counterfactuals in 1960 placing them in the context of
medieval scholastic philosophy were the starting point of a heated debate on
the use of counterfactuals in quantum mechanics (for recent reviews see [97,
95]). Peres formulated perhaps clearest statements about the post-Bell-theorem
status of counterfactuals:
The discussion involves a comparison of the results of experiments
which were actually performed, with those of hypothetical experi-
ments which could have been performed but were not. It is shown
that it is impossible to imagine the latter results in a way compat-
ible with (a) the results of the actually performed experiments, (b)
long-range separability of results of individual measurements, and
(c) quantum mechanics. . . .
There are two possible attitudes in the face of these results. One is
to say that it is illegitimate to speculate about unperformed exper-
iments. In brief “Thou shalt not think.” Physics is then free from
many epistemological difficulties.. . . Alternatively, for those who can-
not refrain from thinking, we can abandon the assumption that the
results of measurements by A are independent of what is being done
by B. . . . Bell’s theorem tells us that such a separation is impossible
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for individual experiments, although it still holds for averages. [78]
The debate in quantum mechanics shows that the applicability of Boolean
logic to statements about physical observables should not taken for granted in
any branch of physics, especially those based on quantum mechanics. Quan-
tum field theory is one. Simply, its focus has stayed with technical feats for so
long that conceptual issues about measurement, inherited from quantum me-
chanics, have been neglected. The tendency has prevailed to assign values to
unobserved parameters in unrealized experimental settings (when we measure
physics of the Universe, it effectively becomes an experimental setting). For
example, the counterfactual in the fine-tuning argument bears on physical pa-
rameters in worlds impossible to observe. Admittedly, this does not lead to
a direct contradiction with quantum mechanical theorems, for quantum me-
chanics deals with normalized probability spaces and Hermitian observables. It
nonetheless remains true that the logic of anthropic arguments runs counter to
the trend warranted by the lessons from quantum mechanics. Speculation about
unperformed experiments is illegitimate not only in the case of unrealized mea-
surements of Hermitian operators, but in a more general sense: it is unsound
to extend to unperformed experiments in unrealized worlds the Boolean logical
structure allowing us to say that physical constants in those worlds have definite
values.
This line of critique resonates with Bohr’s answer to Professor Høffding
when the latter asked him and Heisenberg during a discussion at the University
of Copenhagen: “Where can the electron be said to be in its travel from the
point of entry to the point of detection?” Bohr replied: ”To be? What does
it mean to be?” [105, p. 18-19] The fine-tuning argument as well as general
anthropic arguments employ counterfactuals that contain the verb ‘to be’ in the
conditional. What it means that a world which is referred to in this conditional,
had been, was or is, would have been unclear for Bohr. He was greatly concerned
with the meaning of utterances, famously claiming that “physics is what we can
say about physics” [105, p. 16]. In the case of fine tuning this claim may be
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understood as supporting the view according to which statements of the fine-
tuning argument express no more than bets on the unknown future unique state
of knowledge.
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